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General introduction : Health innovation and social justice in Brazil  
 
Maurice Cassier & Marilena Correa  
 
 Brazil has entered a period of acute crisis characterized by a slump in industrial 
production, including pharmaceutical production in 2015, as well as a crisis in the Unified 
Health System (SUS) which faces cost cutting as growing unemployment and a decline in the 
use of private insurance is increasing the demand for care in the public sector1. Yet the 
systems introduced from the mid-1990s to encourage the nationalization of foreign 
technologies, local pharmaceutical production and access to treatment are still active. This is 
evidenced in the following: in December 2016 the Brazilian government and leading firms 
agreed on a new programme consisting of Product Development Partnerships (PDP) to 
acquire new health technologies and produce “strategic” medication for the SUS; in January 
2017 Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (NIIP) dismissed Gilead’s application 
for a patent on Truvada, a therapeutic combination for the prophylactic treatment of 
HIV/Aids, and in so doing authorized the production of a Brazilian generic; and the 
consortium formed in May 2016 by three private-sector laboratories and Fiocruz is still 
investing in the production of a generic sofosbuvir to supply the government’s hepatitis C 
programme. 
 
 The past twenty years have been characterized by the revival and growth of Brazilian 
health industries under the combined effects of: the local medication production policy to 
treat the Aids epidemic from the early 1990s, initiated by private- and public-sector 
laboratories; the enactment of the law on generic medicines and the creation of the National 
Health Surveillance Agency in 19992; and the policy and funding of the National Social and 
Economic Development Bank (BNDES) to develop the “health industrial complex”, from 
2003. In January 2001 the New York Times held Brazilian policy up as a model3.  
 
 The research team that has authored this book has studied and in some cases 
participated directly in the progressive invention of what now resembles a full-blown 
innovation system, consisting of: 1) numerous technological and industrial partnerships 
between science, government and industry; 2) regulatory and industrial property institutions, 
including the National Institute of Industrial Property, the National Health Surveillance 
Agency, inter-ministerial groups, and civil society organizations, notably patient and citizen 
associations; and 3) mechanisms for the evaluation and certification of medicines, with the 
Health Surveillance Agency and a network of bio-equivalence centres in universities and in 
Contract Research Organizations (CROs). 
 
 While our first research papers published in 2003 concerned the reverse engineering 
work of chemists in public- and private-sector laboratories4, who were seeking to develop 
techniques for the analysis, synthesis and formulation of antiretroviral drugs for HIV/Aids, 
this volume focuses on a subsequent phase characterized by the proliferation of collective 
invention structures and industrial partnerships during the 2000s and 2010s, in the form of 
                                               
1  “Brazil’s health system woes worsen in economic crisis”, Jonathan Watts, The Lancet, 16 April 
2016.  
2 ANVISA: Agencia Nacional de Vigilancia Sanitaria 
3  Tina Rosenberg, “Look at Brazil”, The New York Times Magazine, January 28, 2001.  
4  Cassier M, Correa M, 2003 “Patents, Innovation and Public Health: Brazilian Public-Sector 
Laboratories’ Experience in Copying AIDS Drugs” in Economics of Aids Aid and Access in 
Developing countries, Edited by Moatti and al., ANRS, p 89-107.  
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national and international consortiums, Productive Development Partnerships (PDP)5, and 
contracts and alliances between university laboratories, pharmaceutical firms and start-ups 
created around scientific institutions. These industrial partnerships and technological 
consortiums continue to spread, despite the unfavourable economic and industrial climate 
since 2012 and especially since 2014. The number of PDP grew from 11 in 2009 to 104 in 
2013. In 2014 and 2015, 20 new PDP were set up. They are either between national public- 
and private-sector laboratories, to duplicate technologies, or between Brazilian laboratories 
and international firms that own or have licences for transferred technologies. Their scope 
extends beyond anti-retrovirals for HIV/Aids, to recombinant insulin provided by an Indian 
firm and a Ukrainian laboratory, and a vaccine transferred by Glaxo, for example. We note 
that Brazil’s PDP policy is a target of strong opposition by the US pharmaceutical industry 
syndicate, which is concerned about the emergence of an autonomous industrial policy in the 
field of medicinal drugs, and about the preference given in these partnerships to firms that 
produce in Brazil: “Brazil: Productive Development Partnerships (PDPs) and government 
purchasing: … It remains unclear how the current PDP model might limit competition or how 
Brazil will apply the government purchasing program that offers preferences to locally 
manufactured products and services in public biddings. For these reasons, PhRMA requests 
that Brazil be placed on the Priority Watch List for the 2016 Special 301 Report” (The 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), special 301 submission 
2016).  
 
 The current economic and budgetary crisis could lead to reduced funding for these 
operations, but could also be an incentive to maintain or strengthen them, as a means both to 
boost investments (cf. the announcement of BNDES funding in 2015 and 2016 to finance the 
health industry complex) and to reduce the health product trade deficit that worsened in the 
2000s and is weighing on Brazil’s health economy. We need to remember that the financial 
crisis that hit Brazil in the early 1980s was a driver of the policy to support local production 
of active principles through a reverse engineering programme undertaken by Codetec, the 
R&D firm of Campinas University, with funds from CEME, the Medicines Centre (Central de 
Medicamentos). In October 2015 the Ministry of Health announced nine new PDP, 
highlighting their economic advantages for the government6. At the beginning of that year the 
Brazilian development bank (BNDES) had announced an investment programme for the 
health industry complex, justified by the related reduction of the health trade deficit7. The 
acquisition of new technologies and the growth of the health industries were thus seen as 
strategic answers to the economic crisis. For example, in September 2015, in the field of 
interest to us here, the BNDES granted an essentially non-refundable loan for the 
development of new therapeutic and diagnostic technologies to treat so-called neglected 
diseases (Chagas, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis) by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, in 
partnership with Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DNDI), a foundation created by MSF 
(Médecins Sans Frontières) to coordinate R&D projects. At the same time, strong tension was 
                                               
5 Law 742, Ministry of Health, November 2007; Laws 374 and 375, February 2008; Presidential 
Decree, 12 May 2008; list of strategic products that justify the creation of the health industrial 
complex, 16 May 2008. 
 
6 “Ministerio da Saude anuncia novas PDP destinadas a fabricaçao de medicamentos e equipamento de 
saúde”, INVESTE SAO PAULO, 8 octobre 2015.  
7 The BNDES has a special programme, Profarma, for funding the pharmaceutical industry.   
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running throughout the public health system, evidenced by demonstrations in June 2013 and 
2014 demanding “hospitals rather than stadiums”8.   
  
 
Copying and social medicine  
 
 A crucial characteristic of this Brazilian experience of rebuilding the country’s health 
industries from the early 1990s is that it took place in direct relation to the constitutional right 
to health, which was enshrined in the new Constitution of 19889. The demands of HIV/Aids 
patients and the first initiatives to distribute AZT played a major role in mobilizing both this 
legal instrument and the pharmaceutical laboratories that could duplicate the only molecule 
available at the time. The Director of Microbiologica, the first firm to copy AZT, saw the 
firm’s engagement as the outcome of a technological opportunity: the laboratory’s expertise 
in small molecule chemistry. It was a response to the Aids movements’ demands for access to 
treatment: “Many people died at the time. But these people started these ONGs, non-
governmental organizations, and these started to make, to organize pressure immediately. So 
when it appeared, we decided we'd produce AZT in Brazil … And AZT is a nucleoside and 
the experience and competence of this company is in nucleic acid chemistry. So for us it's like 
manna from heaven”10. In 1996 the Ministry of Health decided to set up a national copying 
programme, while the President of Brazil issued a decree that organized the universal and free 
distribution of medicines to treat the Aids epidemic. The Ministry summoned the Director of 
the federal pharmaceutical laboratory, Eloan Pinheiro, and gave her the list of antiretrovirals 
that it was purchasing at a high price from multinational firms: “And then they called me and 
said: you need to develop drugs for Aids. And I said let’s go”11. Pinheiro compared this list to 
the list of medicines not under patent in Brazil and decided: “we’ll try to reproduce these 
medicines here in Brazil”. This programme was launched in a context of epidemic urgency 
and the fear of being swamped by the number of treatments to distribute: “the evaluation of 
the WHO was so bad they supposed that by 2000 Brazil would have one million people [with 
HIV/Aids], and the prices of the international companies were very high” (Eloan Pinheiro).  
  
While the Farmanguinhos federal laboratory started to supply the Health Ministry for 
the distribution of free generic ARVs to Brazilian patients, Eloan Pinheiro was also involved 
in an international movement initiated by Médecins Sans Frontières, to revive therapeutic 
innovation for a set of pathologies known as “neglected diseases” that barely benefited from 
new molecules put on the market12.  In 1999, MSF created the DND Working Group, 
consisting of experts who had been working for a long time on tropical diseases at the WHO, 
the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, the Harvard School of Public Health, as well as 
                                               
8 A synthesis report on Brazil, published by the OECD in November 2015, highlighted both the 
progress made in access to treatment, with the implementation of the unified health system (SUS) in 
1988, and the persistent insufficiency of public spending on health (OECD Economic Surveys, Brazil, 
synthesis, 51 pages). 
9 Relations between pharmaceutical production and health policy in Brazil have been studied by 
several authors: Galvao J., 2002, “Access to antiretroviral drugs in Brazil”, The Lancet, volume 360, 
Issue 9348, 1862-1865; Amy Nunn, 2009, The Politics and History of Aids Treatment in Brazil, 
Springer, 186 pages; Matthew Flynn, 2015, Pharmaceutical Autonomy and Public Health in Latin 
America: State, Society and Industry in Brazil’s AIDS Program, Routledge, 230 pages.  
10 Interview with Jaime Rabi, April 2003.  
11 Interview with Eloan Pinheiro, April 2005.  
12 Pécoul, Chirac, Trouiller, Pinel, 1999, “Access to essential drugs in poor countries: a lost battle?”, 
JAMA, January 27, 1999; vol 281, n°4.  
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several experts at scientific or pharmaceutical institutions in developing countries, including 
Mahidol University in Malaya and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation. Pinheiro who had just 
launched several generic ARVs, was invited by MSF to participate in this working group: “At 
the time, we had huge visibility because we had produced all the generics for HIV (the 
antiretrovirals). It was the first time that a developing country managed to develop seven 
formulae for Aids medication. And these medicines were put on the market and this gave us 
huge visibility, so Farmanguinhos was invited to this meeting in Paris in 1999”. The Oswaldo 
Cruz Foundation was a founding member of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
(DNDI) in 2003, and the Farmanguinhos Institute was a stakeholder in an international 
consortium set up to develop the formulae of two new artemisinin-based combinations 
(FACT)13. DNDI established its regional office for Latin America in Rio, and now runs many 
research projects on neglected diseases (leishmaniosis, Chagas disease, tuberculosis) with 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation laboratories. A chapter of this book, written by Mady Barbeitas, is 
devoted to collaborative R&D projects on leishmaniasis, involving the Ministry of Health, the 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, and the DNDI Foundation.  
 
Industrial policy was integrated with health policy. The Health Industrial Complex 
policy, proposed by economist Carlos Gadelha14, was designed to acquire and invent new 
technologies and to industrialize them in Brazil in order to supply the public health system, 
which gradually has to meet the population’s needs despite the current lack of public spending 
on health (OMS, 2012, OCDE 2015)15. We could talk of a neo-developmentalist policy since 
the aim is to promote local innovation and production, with a view to reducing dependence on 
foreign imports, from a technological, commercial and health point of view. The public-sector 
laboratories are these industrial partners’ obligatory points of passage. An example is the 
industrial consortium set up in 2007 to produce a generic version of Merck’s efavirenz, and 
which was organized and controlled by the Health Ministry’s Farmanguinhos laboratory (cf. 
Chapter 2 in this book). 
  
Local production and technology creation  
 
 Copying is an integral part of R&D and tends to fuel innovation16. Most importantly, 
the duplication of antiretroviral medicines cannot be reduced to the copying of old 
technologies as they were recorded in patents when registered by the owner. Jaime Rabi, who 
was the first in Brazil to copy AZT in the early 1990s, explains this clearly: “From the 
technology viewpoint it was for us a big challenge. It was not simple to make AZT at the 
time. It was not simple. A lot of technology had to be developed. It was not a case of reverse 
engineering anymore. There was a lot of innovative work being done here to produce AZT… 
the AZT we produced at Microbiologica in the early ‘90s was different in specifications to the 
AZT being produced by Welcome at the time … we knew that we were making AZT by a 
different process, by a better process” (Jaime Rabi, 2003).  Brazilian chemists could not be 
content simply to reproduce the already known synthesis methods, which were often not yet 
stabilized at the time the patents were written and filed. They had to bridge the gap with new 
techniques and improve the processes. This was the case of the reproduction of efavirenz 
                                               
13 FACT: Fixed-Dose Artemisinin Combination Therapy.  
14 Gadelha, C., “The health care economic-industrial complex:  Concepts and general characteristics”, 
C Gadelha, Health, 2013. 
15 http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/FR_WHS2012_Full.pdf, p 131.  
16 Samuelson P., Scotchmer S., 2001, “The law and economics of reverse engineering”, Research 
paper, University of California at Berkeley, 78 p,  
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/l&e%20reveng5.pdf.  
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patented by Merck and put under compulsory license in Brazil in May 2007. The synthesis 
routes that were eventually implemented by Brazilian laboratories were not those indicated by 
Merck in its patent, simply because many improvements had been made: “What I know is that 
what Merck protected, first, has changed a lot: no one practices that, it’s too expensive, it’s 
harmful, there are a lot of bad things in this synthesis; today there are more practical 
syntheses, more direct, safer, less expensive; a lot of improvements. After that patent different 
processes were developed, much more efficient ones, and safer … our synthesis is different 
from Merck’s” (Cristalia Laboratory, 2011). The differences between the efavirenz syntheses 
used now in Brazil and the one described in Merck’s patent are so big that in 2012 the 
Brazilian government even considered not renewing the compulsory license decree issued in 
2007 for five years to foster the production of generics in Brazil!17 In other words, because 
they had changed the process, Brazilian producers no longer encroached on the first patent in 
any way.  
 
  The connections between reproduction and innovation come in various forms. 
Brazilian manufacturers developed many improvements to the ARV synthesis routes, to make 
them more reliable or to improve their productivity and thus their competitiveness with the 
products of Indian or Chinese laboratories: “in the patents, they use 4kg of raw material to 
produce 1kg of stavudine. Here, we use 1.9kg for 1kg. We like this new way” (Labogen, 
2004). These process improvements are generally kept secret so as not to alert Indian or 
Chinese generics producers. Formulation innovations are often patented (three Brazilian 
laboratories have filed patents on new anti-retroviral formulae for HIV/Aids treatment). 
Copying has also led to product innovations in the form of derived or hybrid molecules. For 
instance, the Farmanguinhos federal laboratory developed a molecule derived from efavirenz, 
which it did not patent. Brazilian laboratories also take advantage of the fact that some 
molecules used for HIV/Aids treatment or malaria are in the public domain, in order to 
produce new fixed-dose combinations. The federal laboratory has thus developed new 
combinations in collaboration with Médecins Sans Frontières and the DNDI. Although it 
patented a fixed-dose combination for HIV/Aids in 2002, at MSF’s request it did not patent 
the artesunate and mefloquine fixed-dose combination. 
 
 The private-sector laboratories have increased their patent portfolio significantly since 
the early 2000s. In 2011 Cristalia, which has a large R&D laboratory, had no fewer than 139 
patents. Laboratories in both sectors draw on the expertise of many PhDs whom they recruit 
to orientate their work towards similar or more radical product innovations. One of the most 
remarkable examples of copying linked to innovation is the firm Microbiologica. While this 
laboratory introduced AZT into Brazil in the early 1990s, it also joined innovation networks 
in the USA and Europe, to work on the invention of new antivirals used in treating hepatitis B 
and C. At the beginning of the 2000s the CEO, Jaime Rabi, collaborated with Idenix and 
Pharmasset, two renowned pharmaceutical R&D companies that were spin-offs of Emory 
University. Microbiologica participated actively in the invention of this new therapeutic class 
that is now often in the news because of its prices and the patent wars around it18. In 2016 the 
firm was at the head of a consortium of Brazilian laboratories working on a generic version of 
sofosbuvir. Their aim is not to copy or to transfer the technologies that Microbiologica 
initially helped to develop with the US start-ups, but simply to lift the patent barrier (cf.  
chapter 5 of this book).  
                                               
17 The federal government did finally renew the compulsory license decree for the remainder of the 
process patent’s validity, until 2014. 
18 Our interviews with Jaime Rabi in March 2003, November 2014 and December 2016. Jaime Rabi 
sat on the Pharmasset Board in the late 1990s.  
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 An economic study published in 2010 showed the increase of R&D expenditures 
within Brazilian national firms that had benefited from the growth of the generics market over 
the previous ten years, when spending had been cut in the local branches of multinationals: 
“The rates of innovation for the Brazilian firms increased, like the amounts invested in 
internal R&D and total of innovation, and we found yet that these Brazilian firms invested 
little more in R&D than the multinational industries in Brazil … For the initial period of 
analysis, domestic firms would spend less than foreign firms. Innovative domestic firms 
would spend only 66% of the amount spent by multinationals. The result is inverted in 2005, 
when domestic firms spent 107% of the amount spent by foreign firms. The expenses of 
domestic firms increased whereas the ones of foreign firms declined”19. Not only did the 
R&D spending of Brazilian generics producers increase, but also the level of training of their 
employees, measured in terms of the number who had PhDs, Master’s, and other higher 
education degrees. In other words, the copy of technologies and the production of generic 
medicines boost R&D and innovation. This conclusion, based on research in Brazilian firms 
since 2000 (PINTEC survey) is consistent with the conclusions of our first surveys in public- 
and private-sector laboratories engaged in the copying of antiretrovirals for Aids (Cassier, 
Correa 2003)20.  
  
Collective Invention  
 
This book highlights the collective dimension of technology development in the 
reproduction of inventions, as well as their improvement or radical modification. The 
justifications for this cooperation are multiple: the necessity to pool the complementary skills 
and know-how of scientific and industrial institutions, and of the producers of active 
principles and those of final medicines; the wish to combine similar knowledge and assets, to 
share information and advance faster, to validate technologies, and to secure several supply 
sources; and finally the adoption of a collective learning strategy with a view to bringing 
together the participants in the network. The collectives in question may be formed 
spontaneously around know-how trading, or may be R&D or production consortiums 
coordinated by contracts governing the division of work and the allocation of resources 
between the parties. Collective invention, as the economist Allen understands it 21 , 
characterizes the case of Brazil, where it reinforces clusters of public- and private-sector 
laboratories with a view to building a national technological and industrial base. Partnerships 
between small or medium-sized laboratories, whose R&D capacities are modest compared to 
those of multinationals, constitutes their strength. 
                                               
19 “Structure and innovation in pharmaceutical industry in Brazil: the impact of generics drugs”, 
Thiago Caliari and Ricardo Ruiz, 2010, 16 pages. These authors took into account the following 
indicators to measure the innovation rate: 1- product innovations; 2- process innovations; 3- patent 
applications filed at the national patent office; 4- ongoing R&D activity; 5- employees’ above-average 
education; 6- the firm’s exports; 7- the firm exports and get a premium price.   
20 The results of a survey of 16 biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms in 2008 likewise indicated the 
positive impact of the ARV copying programme on innovation: “Another recent example includes the 
partnerships between public pharmaceutical laboratories and private national pharmo-chemical firms 
for the national production of anti-retroviral medication to supply the national program to care for 
AIDS patients. Partnerships of this sort show the importance of joint action by system players to 
promote innovation and development in the country”, Innovation in Brazil: Public policies and 
business strategies, Ricardo Sennes, 46 pages.   
21 Allen, R, 1983, “Collective Invention”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 4, p 1-24 
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 Forms of know-how trading (Von Hippel)22  appeared between public and private 
producers of generic medicines engaged in the copying of ARVs for HIV/Aids when this 
collaboration enabled them to enhance and to validate their technological developments. The 
sharing of information between imitators compensated in a sense for the absence of 
interaction with the inventor and owner of the technologies which, as we know, is crucial in 
the duplication of new technologies (Collins). Thus, for instance, chemists at the private-
sector laboratory Nortec used their firm’s highly specialized equipment to help chemists at 
Farmanguinhos solve problems in characterizing the indinavir molecule, and in return 
received analysis methods developed at the federal laboratory. Additionally, when the latter 
compared samples of active principles provided by producers in the private sector, it freely 
and confidentially shared the results of its tests with them. It gave each of them advice on 
improving their processes and products. The analytical chemistry department at 
Farmanguinhos learned a great deal from working with chemists at Microbiologica, which is 
an expert in small molecule chemistry. Likewise, they benefited significantly from the free 
assistance of chemists at the federal university who had developed new syntheses and who 
transferred knowledge on new classes of anti-retroviral molecules. Private-sector laboratories 
could also agree ad hoc to share copying between themselves, as for instance Cristalia and 
Nortec did in 2006 to duplicate tenofovir. 
 
 One of the most successful forms of this pooling of research and knowledge was the 
consortium set up in 2007 to produce a generic of Merck’s efavirenz that was under 
compulsory license. This consortium, headed by the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, brought 
together three laboratories producing active principles, and the Farmanguinhos federal 
laboratory that produced the final medicine. While the private-sector laboratories in the 
consortium initially developed their synthesis process separately, they were gradually led to 
join forces and to cooperate in order to solve certain problems: “we discussed this with other 
companies that used to make efavirenz” (Cristalia, 2011). 
 
The consortiums’ importance grew during the 2000s, both nationally and 
internationally, in the reproduction of existing technologies and the invention of new 
pharmaceutical or diagnostic technologies. These were industrial consortiums or PDP, 
consisting of public laboratories and private pharmaceutical chemicals firms, and that were 
formed to combine the production of APIs and the formulation of final medicines. There were 
several types of PDP, oriented either towards the copying of existing technologies – 
tenofovir23, ritonavir, kaletra and raltegravir –, or towards the invention of new medicine 
formulations or biological tests, as in the case of the PDP set up between the Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation and Lifemed to develop a miniaturized multiplex test. While most PDP consisted 
of Brazilian scientific and technological institutions and firms, others were organized with 
transnational firms for the acquisition of existing technologies, such as the PDP formed 
between Farmanguinhos and Bristol Myers Squibb for the local production of atazanavir, the 
PDP between Merck for Raltegravir, the one formed with the Canadian Apotex for Darunavir, 
and the one concluded with Chembio Diagnostics for the acquisition of a diagnostic platform. 
 
 In several chapters we analyse different types of consortium set up on a national and 
international scale. The research carried out to acquire the technology for thermostable 
                                               
22 Von Hippel E, 1987, “Cooperation between rivals: informal know how trading”, Research Policy, 16, 291-
302. 
23 “Making Tenofovir accessible in the Brazilian public health system: patent conflicts and generic 
production”,  J. Veras, Developing World Bioethics, volume 14, number 2014, p 92-100.  
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molecules 24  for ritonavir was set within a national consortium between public-sector 
pharmaceutical laboratories, the private firm Cristalia, the National Technological Institute 
(NTI), and an international consortium, the Technological Cooperation Network on 
HIV/AIDS, in which the Chinese firm Desano played an essential role as supplier of 
Ritanovir raw material samples to develop a thermostable formulation. The FACT consortium 
set up in 2003 to develop new artemisinin-based therapeutic combinations to treat malaria 
involved both French universities and start-ups, and the Farmanguinhos federal laboratory. In 
particular, the latter benefited from the contribution of recording methods provided by the 
French research company Catalent 25 . In October 2015 the Centre for Information 
Technologies (CIT) at the Ministry of Science and Technology, announced the forthcoming 
arrival of a new portable diagnostic platform for Chagas and other tropical diseases, which 
had been developed by an international consortium set up in 2011 with the European Union. 
The consortium consisted of five Brazilian laboratories and six European ones (French, 
German, Italian and Portuguese) and was jointly funded by the Brazilian government research 
agency CNPQ and the European Union26.  
 
 In his chapter devoted to new diagnostic methods, Koichi Kameda shows multiple 
cooperative projects currently existing between the Fiocruz Biomanguinhos laboratory, 
university laboratories, Brazilian start-ups, and the creation of hybrid technological 
institutions such as the IBMP, the Institute of Molecular Biology of Paraná, spawned by the 
partnership between the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation and the Department of Science, 
Technology and Graduates of the State of Parana, which set up a test production factory. The 
proliferation of these collective invention structures, involving science, government and 
industry, and which largely transcend the framework of PDP governed by the Ministry of 
Health, attest to the emergence of a system of innovation in Brazil’s health industries, and the 
diffusion of what Henry Etzkowitz and his colleagues, in 2005, called the “incubator” form 
involving universities, industrial syndicates, cooperatives, and NGOs27.  
 
Instituting government and civil society regulation of intellectual property  
  
 The regulation of intellectual property needs to find the right balance between 
allowing the copying of essential medicines for public health, and encouraging and protecting 
the inventions of national laboratories. Public-sector laboratories as well as private Brazilian 
firms started in the early 2000s to file patent applications, both at the Brazilian patent office 
and internationally, and this tendency is growing. Is it possible to allow both the 
nationalization and copying of foreign technologies considered by the Health Ministry to be 
strategic, and the stimulation of local innovations ? 
 
 One of the most original devices and also one of the most controversial ones, 
                                               
24 In this volume, see the chapter by Cristina D’Almeida: “Knowledge generation and laboratory 
capacity building in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Brazil: Experiences on the development of a heat-
stable formulation comprising Ritonavir”.  
25 « Needs driven versus market driven pharmaceutical innovation : the consortium for the 
development of a new medicine against malaria in Brazil », K Kameda, Developing World 
Bioethics, 2014, p 101-108. 
.  
26 http://www.poditrodi.org. 
27 “Towards meta-innovation in Brazil: the evolution of the incubator and the emergence of a triple 
helix”, Henry Etzkowitz, José Manoel Carvalho de Melho, Mariza Almeida, Research Policy, 34, 
2005, p 411-424.  
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experimented with in Brazil since 2001, is the authorization given to the National Health 
Surveillance Agency, ANVISA, to examine the granting of pharmaceutical patents. In Brazil 
this process therefore falls under the joint authority of the National Institute of Industrial 
Property, and of ANVISA. The latter has recruited chemists and specialists in biotechnology 
to create a division specially for examining drug patents. This special regulation of 
pharmaceutical patents by ANVISA, which results in a substantially lower acceptance rate 
than that of the patent office’s examiners, is cited in a manual published by the WHO to help 
developing countries apply industrial property rights by taking sides with public health28. This 
approach has been strongly challenged by the pharmaceutical multinationals through various 
court cases. In his chapter on “prior consent” of the National Health Surveillance Agency, 
Edouardo Guimaraes presents the results of an ethnographic survey that he carried out at the 
ANVISA examination division.    
 
 The second chapter, co-signed by Jacqueline Soares and Eduardo Guimaraes, 
describes a controversy over the patentability of polymorph molecules, involving a wide 
diversity of actors, from the chemists at the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, to the chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals industries, the National Institute of Industrial Property, the National Health 
Surveillance Agency, the Inter-ministerial Group on Intellectual Property, and even 
Parliament. Some molecules are indeed able to exist in several crystalline forms, which can 
influence the molecule’s properties (bio availability, stability, efficacy). To what extent can 
the process of obtaining polymorphs be patented? Some see polymorphs as existing in nature 
and therefore as not being patentable. The prohibition on the patentability of polymorphs 
would also prevent the ever-greening of patents from which the multinationals benefit. The 
Health Ministry and the ANVISA patent examination division, wanting to limit the extension 
of the patentability of pharmaceutical molecules, were against patents on polymorphs. The 
patent office, wanting to encourage incremental innovations, was in favour of them. The two 
authors show the phenomenon of learning on the occasion of two years of public debates, in 
2007 and 2008. We see that Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property is more severe 
than its US and European counterparts, and that patents previously granted would no longer 
be approved today, due to an elevation in the standards of patentability. This highly technical 
subject has become a matter of public debate involving science, industry, the State and civil 
society. 
 
 The chapter by Pedro Villela introduces new actors into the pharmaceutical patent 
regulation field: international NGOs such as MSF, and patent organizations in Brazil. We can 
follow these organizations’ learning curve with regard to intellectual property law, through 
their interaction with academic legal experts (e.g. Carlos Correa from the University of 
Buenos Aires); patent experts at the Farmanguinhos federal pharmaceutical laboratory (e.g. 
Wanise Barroso); the patent examination division at ANVISA; and international experts such 
as James Love of the Consumer Project of Technology, and Tahir Amin at I-Mak29 during 
training seminars or battles for obtaining compulsory licences or the cancellation of certain 
patents. The organizations have used the law as a weapon to obtain the suspension (efavirenz) 
or cancellation (tenofovir) of patents on certain drugs, the molecules of which are then 
nationalized by Brazilian firms. They recruit their own legal experts to fight these legal 
                                               
28 Carlos Correa: Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public 
health perspective. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2007. 
 
29  “I’MAK  is  a  team  of  lawyers  and  scientists  increasing  access  to  affordable  medicines  by  
making  sure  the  patent  system  works”  (I-­‐MAK).  
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battles. Where relevant, they cooperate with organizations in other countries of the South, for 
example India, to challenge certain patents such as those of Gilead on tenofovir and, more 
recently, on sufosbuvir. 
 
 We thus see that in Brazil there is public and citizen regulation of pharmaceutical 
patents, with the intervention of the Health Surveillance Agency in the granting of patents, the 
patient organizations, which monitor the patent examination procedure or even to oppose it, 
the Ministry of Health, which fights for years for a compulsory licence, or the Farmanguinhos 
federal laboratory which in 2006 opposed Gilead’s patent on tenofovir, until finally the 
molecule fell into the public domain.  
 
 There are ongoing discussions among industrial property experts, both in industry and 
among economists, on the impact of these interventions on the innovation economy that the 
government would like to have. Kenneth Shadlen, a British economist, highlights the 
potentially negative effects on innovation of certain rules upheld by ANVISA, on the non-
patentability of polymorph molecules or the second therapeutic use of an already-known 
molecule. Here, ANVISA’s action could penalize the incremental innovations of Brazilian 
laboratories 30. In response, the Agency has pointed out that ever-greening is essentially of 
pharmaceutical multinationals’ doing, and that a less rigorous examination would mean to 
catch at shadows and to reinforce the international laboratories’ power. We have found that 
the universities and the public- and private-sector pharmaceutical laboratories are registering 
more and more patents on molecules derived from those that they duplicate. Examples are 
Farmanguinhos’ patents on molecules derived from artesunate, used for malaria, on new 
combinations of molecules, even a patent granted in 2001 on a new family of molecules used 
for HIV/Aids treatment, jointly owned by Farmanguinhos and the Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro. Cristalia, one of the most innovative firms in Brazil, has benefited from the 
compulsory licence on efavirenz to produce the generic API and the medicine, since 2007. It 
has simultaneously accumulated a portfolio of 139 patents since the early 2000s. The director 
of industrial property at the Farmanguinhos laboratory drafted the opposition statement that 
caused Gilead’s patent to fall into the public domain in 2008, and on a daily basis draws up 
the patent applications filed by the laboratory’s chemists to govern the exploitation of their 
inventions. The delicate fine-tuning of patent management is intended to protect and control 
Brazilian firms’ and universities’ inventions, while nonetheless preserving a public domain in 
which access to treatment is facilitated. 
 
Constructing and regulating the generic drug market  
 
 Our book also considers another dimension of the innovation system: the regulation of 
generic medicines that was set up from 1999. The chapter written by Marilena Correa, 
Maurice Cassier & Maria Andrea Loyola, shows the formation, expansion and regulation of 
the similar and generic medicines’ markets since the 1990’s. In particular, it explores the 
diffusion of bio-equivalence tests for the copy of both similar and generic medicines. The bio-
equivalence tests carried out in centres authorized by ANVISA measure the quality of copies 
to guarantee their inter-changeability with first medicines.  
                                               
30  Shadlen, Kenneth. “The political contradictions of incremental innovation: lessons from 
pharmaceutical patent examination in Brazil”, Politics & Society, v. 39, n. 2, pp. 143-174, 2011 ; 
SHADLEN Kenneth, The politics of patents and drugs in Brazil and Mexico : the industrial bases of 
health policies, in Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health, Access to Drugs in 
Developing Countries, Edited by K Shadlen, S Guennif, A Guzman, N Lalitha, p 178-201. 
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 The laboratories engaged in the copying of antiretrovirals for treating HIV/Aids 
started very early, even before the adoption of the generics law and the creation of ANVISA 
in 1999, to test their medicines for bio-equivalence. Their intention at the time was to be able 
to defend themselves against accusations by patent owners, that Brazilian copies were of poor 
quality. 
 
 A noteworthy article published by the University of Recife Bio-equivalence centre, in 
May 2002, in the Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências (Annals of the Brazilian 
Academy of Sciences), traced bio-equivalence testing on similar drugs in Brazil back to 1995: 
“our research group started clinical trials and bioequivalence studies, with the collaboration of 
the public pharmaceutical laboratory of Pernambuco State (LAFEPE), the Brazilian official 
company to pioneer the development of medicines for AIDS and herpes virus treatment, 
between 1995 and 1998, even before the establishment of generic policy in Brazil”31. The 
article then gave the results of bio-equivalence for AZT, Ganiclovir, didanosine, lamivudine 
and zalcitabine, and for a LAFEPE fixed-dose combination “similar to the reference 
medicine”. A report by the Ministry of Health in February 2001, titled “National Drug 
Policy”32, also listed the Brazilian copies produced by the federal laboratory in Rio that had 
passed the bio-equivalence tests: “Six Far-Manguinhos-produced drugs – zidovudine, 
didanosine, lamivudine, zidovudine+lamivudine and zalcitabine – have been approved in 
bioequivalence tests and thus are eligible for licensing as a generic drug. The bioequivalence 
testing of indinavir and nevirapine is in its final phases”. The report pointed out that from then 
on, all medicines bought by the Ministry of Health had to pass bio-equivalence tests: 
“Bioequivalence tests, proving the interchangeability of the drugs, are a recent achievement of 
the Brazilian National Drug Policy, guaranteed by the 1999 Generic Drugs Bill” (National 
Drug Policy, February 2001). We also identified several articles by the laboratory of 
Campinas University, one of the oldest and largest bio-equivalence centres in the country, 
which disclosed the bio-equivalence results of private laboratories’ copies. In August 2000, 
the director of the bio-equivalence centre, Gilberto de Nucci, evoked these tests with other 
international scientists: “we routinely use healthy volunteers for bioequivalence drugs 
(protease inhibitors or transcriptase reverse inhibitors). We generally perform single dose 
administration of the two formulations”. In February 2002, de Nucci’s team published the 
bio-equivalence results of the copy of nevirapine in the Journal of Mass Spectrometry: “this 
method was employed in a bioequivalence study of two nevirapine tablet formulations 
(Nevirapina from Far-Manguinhos, Brazil, as a test formulation, and Viramune from 
Boehringer Ingelheim do Brasil Quimica e Famaceutica, as a reference formulation”33. The 
bio-equivalence measurements were applied to so-called “similar” medicines even before they 
became a legal requirement in 2003 and 2004. 
 
 The growth of the bio-equivalence test market and the extension of the network of bio-
equivalence centres approved by the Health Surveillance Agency is a keystone in the 
construction of the pharmaceutical innovation system. In 2000, the national bio-equivalence 
centres performed only 27% of all bio-equivalence tests, whereas in 2010 they performed 
87% of them. In the meantime, ANVISA had funded the creation of bio-equivalence centres 
in universities. In 2010, 27 analysis centres, with a public or private status, had been approved 
                                               
31 Antonio J. Alves, “Clinical Studies-Generic Medicines”, An Acad Bras Cienc, 2002, 74, 3, p 552. 
32 “National Drug Policy”, Ministry of Health, Brazil, February 2001, 21 pages. 
33 “Nevirapine quantification in human plasma by high-performance liquid chromatography coupled to 
electrospray tandem mass spectrometry. Application to bioequivalence study”, Laurito TL1, 
Santagada V, Caliendo G, Oliveira CH, Barrientos-Astigarraga RE, De Nucci G, J Mass Spectrom. 
2002 Apr.; 37(4):434-41. 
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and integrated into REBLAS, the national network supervised by ANVISA. The last chapter 
of our book describes the current map of bio-equivalence centres in Brazil supporting 
therapeutic regulation and innovation. 
 
An innovation system in the making34  
 
 The innovation system that we define here combines diverse collective invention 
structures, measures to regulate industrial property – designed to achieve a balance between 
innovation policy and public health policy –, and standards and systems to measure the bio-
equivalence and the therapeutic efficacy of medicines. At the same time, the studies published 
here draw a map of the main actors and obligatory points of passage of this innovation system 
in the making. One of the most noteworthy aspects is the multiple roles of the public-sector 
pharmaceutical laboratories: the Farmanguinhos lab and the LAFEPE in Recife, as well as the 
official laboratories of several States, for instance Fiocruz in Parana, known for its diagnostic 
methods. The federal laboratory and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation supervising it are involved 
in the creation of technologies, in their dissemination in industry, and in the regulation of 
industrial property through the patents that they own or the oppositions or demands for 
compulsory licences that they institute. Public-sector laboratories are necessarily involved in 
the hundreds of PDP created since 200935.  
 
 Our book also highlights a group of private-sector laboratories involved in many PDP 
to develop and produce the active principles of medicines. The Ministry of Health asks them 
to develop the production of a particular medicine on the list of strategic products. From the 
late 1990s Cristalia in the State of Sao Paulo, one of the most active of these laboratories, 
embarked on the reverse engineering of antiretrovirals for HIV/Aids treatment and from 2002 
signed R&D agreements with the Farmanguinhos laboratory and the Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro. It headed the industrial consortium that produced efavirenz, put under 
compulsory license in 2007, and increased its industrial investments to support the growth of 
the PDP in the 2010s. Cristalia is also very active in the industrial property domain, where it 
patents its own inventions and opposes certain patents. Nortec, a spin-off of the federal 
laboratory in the State of Rio de Janeiro, entered the field of antiretrovirals in the 2000s, at the 
request of the government that was a 20% shareholder in the firm. Nortec regularly has R&D 
partnerships with the federal laboratory and with its chemistry department. Microbiologica, a 
spin-off of the Federal University of Rio, founded in the 1980s, is an R&D firm producing 
medicines. It was the first laboratory to embark on the copying of AZT in the very early 
1990s. In the early 2000s it participated in innovation networks based primarily in the US and 
Europe, which developed the new generation of antiretrovirals for treating hepatitis B and C. 
In particular, it provided the synthesis processes of these antivirals – processes that it patented 
and licensed. Apart from these firms created in the 1980s and 1990s, this book discusses the 
                                               
34  The recent report “The Brazilian Innovation System: a mission-oriented Policy Proposal”, Marianna 
Mazzucato, Caetano Penna, 2016, Cgee, 114 pages, also highlights the emergence of an innovation 
sub-system in the health sector, p. 12 and p. 82.  
35  Waldemiro Francisco Sorte Junior: “The production and R&D structure of the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical industry: the role of public procurement and public drug production”, Global Public 
Health, Vol. 7, No. 10, December 2012, 1062-1079; Matthew Flynn, “Public Production of Anti-
Retroviral Medicines in Brazil, 1990–2007”, Development and Change, volume 39, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 
513-536.  
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arrival of new start-ups, especially in the fields of diagnostic methods and medical devices36. 
 
 Brazilian universities are likewise participants in this health industry innovation 
system. Diverse forms of collaboration exist between university laboratories and 
pharmaceutical firms, through: R&D contracts to develop technologies for producing generic 
medicines or new molecules; consultancy agreements with academic researchers who sit on 
the Boards of scientific firms; and patents owned jointly by universities and private firms. 
Research statistics show a growth in the number of patents registered by Brazilian universities 
in the field of health during the 2000s37, even though there are also studies showing the 
problems involved in their industrialization 38 . Universities moreover host many bio-
equivalence and clinical trial centres, although the feeling in industry is that there are not 
enough of certain phases of clinical studies.    
 
 The National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA), created in 1999, is a key player 
in this innovation system39. Its intervention in the regulation of pharmaceutical patents and the 
fact that it has kept this role despite recurrent clashes with the National Institute of Industrial 
Property and the international pharmaceutical industry, are both remarkable and controversial. 
ANVISA also funded the network of bio-equivalence centres to foster a system of 
measurement and certification of copied medicines. Not only does it issue certificates of good 
production practice or certificates of approval for bio-equivalence centres, it also advises 
laboratories with a view to raising the standards and the quality of health products. In the 
early 2000s ANVISA funded the Farmanguinhos federal laboratory’s research and 
monographic studies on standards for antiretrovirals.  
 
 The Ministry of Health strongly supported the emergence of this innovation system: it 
propelled the ARV copying programme in 1996 and encouraged the public laboratories as 
well as private firms to participate in it. It has also been heavily involved in the regulation of 
industrial property rights in several ways: by creating the prior consent device for medicine 
patents, under the authority of ANVISA; by preparing the compulsory licence decision on 
efavirenz in March 2004; and by acting within the Inter-Ministerial Group on Industrial 
Property (IGIP) to limit the extension of pharmaceutical patents and their ever-greening. The 
Ministry of Health has moreover been responsible for the health industry complex, and 
                                               
36 See the WHO study “Local Production and Technology Transfer to increase Access to medical 
Devices. Addressing the barriers and challenges in low and middle-income countries”, 2012, on the 
development of new technological firms in Brazil, p. 34.  
37 Thiago Caliari, Roberto Mazzoleni and Luciano Martins Costa Povoa (2013) point out the growing 
role of Brazilian universities and public research organizations in patenting, and their importance in 
the chemicals, biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors : “Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
in Brazil post-TRIPS” in “TRIPS Compliance, National Patent Regimes and Innovation”, Edited by 
Sunil Mani and Richard R Nelson, Edward Elgar, p. 29-30 ; see also “University and Patenting in 
Brazil”, Ana Lucia Vitale Torkomian, Marli Elisabeth Ritter dos Santo, Helice, volume 2, 2013, Issue 
1 ; Rosana Ceron di Georgio : “From University to industry : Technology Transfer at Unicamp in 
Brazil”, Handbook of best practices, 2007, p 1747- 1752 ; OECD 2008, Science and Innovation 
Outlook, country notes, p 164.  
38  Gustavo Dalmarco, Mariana de Freitas Dewes, Paulo Antonio Zawislak, Antonio Domingos 
Padula, “Universities’ Intellectual Property: Path for Innovation or Patent Competition?”, J. Technol. 
Manag. Innov. 2011, Volume 6, Issue 3.   
39 Matthew Flynn and Egléubia Andrade de Oliveira have studied ANVISA, in particular: 
“Regulatory Capitalism in Emerging Markets: an Institutionnal Analysis of Brazil Health’s 
Surveillance Agency (ANVISA)”, 2008, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco.  
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approves PDP. It has continually worked with networks of patient organizations, notably in 
the field of HIV/Aids.  
 
 The patient organizations and NGOs have also asserted themselves as actors in this 
innovation system. Over time, they have become protagonists that monitor and regulate 
medicine patents. From 2006 they engaged in petitioning the Institute of Industrial Property to 
refuse or cancel certain patents, particularly the one on tenofovir, and in 2015 Gilead’s patent 
on Sofosbuvir. They have supported the local production of generic medicines, and are 
currently critical of the high prices of Brazilian generics40. In 2006 they demanded an audit of 
Brazil’s industrial capabilities 41 . Patient organizations and NGOs have also developed 
collaboration with the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation for the development of new medicines for 
HIV/Aids and neglected diseases. Today they are calling for more transparency in the PDP, 
from which they feel excluded.  
 
 The map of health industry innovation networks has thus become denser since the late 
1990s, even though shortcomings persist: the lack of investment in the production of chemical 
intermediates and active principles for pharmaceuticals; the fact that joint R&D efforts 
between private-sector firms are likely to be impeded by inadequacies in the cooperative 
strategies of firms; and the priority given to the short term. The technological content of PDP 
needs to be evaluated, as well as the setting of prices, which are often deemed to be too high.  
 
Sociology in action  
 
 The research reported in this book is about science, technology and law in the making, 
as shown in the field studies that were carried out in university chemistry laboratories, in 
industrial pharmaceutical laboratories in both the public and private sectors, and at the patent 
examination divisions of ANVISA (the Health Surveillance Agency) and the National 
Institute of Industrial Property. We examine the work of chemists, of patent experts and of 
pharmacologists at the bio-equivalence centres, thus reconstructing the research and 
knowledge creation involved in the duplication of medicines, in the adaptation of 
technologies, and in the development of secondary inventions. This furthermore enables us to 
monitor the patent examiners’ interpretations, as well as discussions on the scope of 
patentability or of the public domain, both in Parliament and at ANVISA. This research, 
started in 2002 on the reverse engineering of HIV/Aids medications, is still underway in 
broader fields: antivirals for hepatitis, diagnostic methods, therapeutic innovations for treating 
neglected diseases (malaria, Chagas, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis). We have thus explored the 
strengthening of laboratories’ R&D capabilities and the multiplication of technological and 
industrial partnerships, at the same time as the dissemination and standardization of bio-
equivalence tests for copied medicines. 
 
 Most of the authors of this book are specialized in more than one discipline, for 
example in law and in sociology or pharmaceuticals, or in medicine and in sociology or 
economics. Cristina d’Almeida presents an analysis of the consortium working on 
thermostable drug technologies that she studied from the inside when she was at the 
Farmanguinhos federal laboratory and then at the Ministry of Health. Jacqueline Soares, a 
                                               
40 Amy Nunn, Elize M Fonseca, Francisco Bastos, Sofia Gruskin, Joshua Salomon, “Evolution of 
Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazil in the Context of Free and Universal Access to AIDS Treatment”,  
Plos Medicine, November 2007, p 1804-1816.  
41 Joseph Fortunak and Octavio Antunes, 2006, “ARV Production in Brazil: an evaluation”, Report for 
the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association (ABIA) and MSF Brazil.   
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chemist and patent examiner at the Institute of Industrial Property, analyses discussions on the 
patentability of polymorph molecules. Mady Barbeitas, a veterinarian and sociologist, has 
spent an 18-month internship at the regional branch of the DNDI Foundation in Rio de 
Janeiro, which enabled her to observe innovation projects concerning leishmaniasis treatment. 
Koichi Kameda, a lawyer, did internships in the legal services of the Institute of Molecular 
Biology of Parana and at the Biomanguinhos Institute in Rio, to study R&D projects and the 
production of new diagnostic methods for detecting infectious pathologies. Eduardo 
Gumaraes completed an internship as an observer at the patent examination division of 
ANVISA to study the routine implementation of the prior consent procedure. Pedro Villela 
carried out an ethnographic study of the health-related activism of Médecins Sans Frontières 
and HIV/Aids patient organizations. For the past 15 years, Maurice Cassier and Marilena 
Correa have been following the work of chemists and experts in industrial property working 
on the duplication of anti-retrovirals used in Aids treatment and today in producing direct-
action antivirals for hepatitis. The anthropologist Maria Andrea Loyola had studied the 
genesis of generic medicine policy in the 1980s.  
 
 Several authors of this book have been engaged in actions concerning intellectual 
property regulation, ranging from patent examination at the Institute of Industrial Property or 
ANVISA (Jacqueline Soares), to the negotiation of technology transfer agreements for the 
Farmanguinhos public-sector laboratory (Cristina d’Almeida), the initiation of opposition to 
the tenofovir patent (Maurice Cassier and Marilena Correa, along with Wanise Barroso in 
charge of intellectual property at Fiocruz), or campaigns for the decision on a compulsory 
licence on efavirenz in 2007. Some of them, like Jacqueline Soares at Microbiologica, have 
participated directly in reverse engineering. 
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